Multilevel Bayesian Parameter Estimation in the Presence of Model
  Inadequacy and Data Uncertainty by Shahmoradi, Amir
Multilevel Bayesian Parameter Estimation in the Presence of
Model Inadequacy and Data Uncertainty
Amir Shahmoradi 1,2,3,?
September 24, 2018
Abstract Model inadequacy and measurement uncertainty are two of the most confounding
aspects of inference and prediction in quantitative sciences. The process of scientific inference
(the inverse problem) and prediction (the forward problem) involve multiple steps of data anal-
ysis, hypothesis formation, model construction, parameter estimation, model validation, and
finally, the prediction of the quantity of interest. This article seeks to clarify the concepts of
model inadequacy and bias, measurement uncertainty, and the two traditional classes of uncer-
tainty: aleatoric versus epistemic, as well as their relationships with each other in the process
of scientific inference. Starting from basic principles of probability, we build and explain a hier-
archical Bayesian framework to quantitatively deal with model inadequacy and noise in data.
The methodology can be readily applied to many common inference and prediction problems
in science, engineering, and statistics.
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Table 1: Nomenclature and Definitions of Symbols in This Manuscript
R The reality or truth representing one event, without any observational bias or uncertainty.
R The set containing the truth R for each individual event that is observed.
ΩR The observational sampling space to which each event in the dataset belongs: R ∈ R ⊂ ΩR.
Ri The reality or truth, R, about the ith event in event-set R.
RRi A subset of R on which the ith event, Ri, depends. It can be and often is a null set.
D All data about an event as observed, which is subject to measurement error, unlike R.
D The set of all observations, each of which corresponds to one unique event, Ri ∈ R.
Di All observational data, D, about the ith observation in dataset D.
U A stochastic variable representing difference between R and the output, R′, of Mphys.
U The set of all U i, each of which corresponds to one event Ri ∈ R.
R∗ One possible realization of R, given D and the corresponding noise model, Mnois.
R∗ One possible realization of R, given D and the set of noise models, Mnois.
R∗Ri One possible realization of RRi .
ΩR∗ The (super)set containing all possible realizations, R∗, of the set R.
Mphys The physical model hypothesized to hold for the collection of events in R.
M inad The statistical physics-based model that quantifies the inadequacy of Mphys in describing R.
Mnois The statistical model that quantifies the experimental measurement uncertainty (noise) in D.
Mnois The set of statistical models Mnois,i corresponding to each observation Di ∈ D.
θphys The vector of parameters of the physical model Mphys.
θinad The vector of parameters of the inadequacy model M inad.
θnois The vector of parameters of the noise model Mnois.
Θ(·) The parameter space of a model, (·) – e.g., Mphys : Θphys, M inad : Θinad, Mnois : Θnois.
ndo The number of data observations in D (or equivalently, the number of events in R).
nda The number of data attributes by which each event is characterized; length of R & D.
npp The number of parameters of the physical model; length of θphys; dimension of Θphys.
npi The number of parameters of the inadequacy model; length of θinad; dimension of Θinad.
npn The number of parameters of the noise model; length of θnois; dimension of Θnois.
R The set of real numbers.
(·)′ The output of Mphys, which may or may not be identical to the input entity, (·), to Mphys.
pi(·) The Probability Density Function (PDF) of a statistical model.
L(·) The likelihood function of the parameters of a model.
I(·) The prior knowledge about the subscript entity, (·).
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(a) The scientific methodology.
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(b) The prediction pyramid.
Fig. 1: (a) The steps of scientific methodology, involving data collection, hypothesis formulation, construction of a
mathematical model and objective function, which is subsequently optimized to constrain the parameters of the model,
a process known as inversion or inverse problem. Once validated, the model can be used to make predictions about the
quantity of interest (forward problem). (b) The prediction pyramid, depicting the three hierarchical levels of predictive
inference from bottom to top: Calibration, Validation, and Prediction of the Quantity of Interest (QoI). The rear face of
the tetrahedron represents reality (truth), R, about the set of observed phenomena, which is never known to the observer.
The right-front face of the tetrahedron represents the observational data, D, which results from the convolution of the
truth/reality, R, with various forms of measurement uncertainty. The left-front face represents the scenarios, S, under
which data is collected, as well as the set of models that are hypothesized to describe the unknown truth, R [53, 54, 59, 61].
1 Introduction
The process of scientific inference involves the collection of experimental data from observations
of a set of natural phenomena, the analysis and reduction of the collected dataset, the formula-
tion of a hypothesis (i.e., development of a physics-based mathematical model) that attempts
to explain various potential causal relationships between different characteristics of data, and,
finally, testing the predictions of the proposed model against new observational data by per-
forming new experiments (Figure 1a).
In the majority of scientific problems, the proposed physical model involves a set of parame-
ters that have to be tuned in order to best describe the available data. For example, Einstein’s
famous equation of mass-energy equivalence, E = mc2, relates the mass, m, of any material to
an equivalent amount of energy, E, via an a-priori unknown constant, c, that is the speed of
light, which has to be determined by experimental data. The process of inferring the parameters
of the physical model is commonly known as inversion or an inverse problem, which could also
be regarded as model calibration (Figure 1b).
Once the parameters of a physical model are constrained, the proposed physical model has
to be verified and its predictions validated against a new independent dataset. Extensive liter-
ature already exists on the topic of model verification and validation [e.g., 3, 4, 7, 8, 24, 44,
51, 56, 60, 66] as well as on decision theory [for elegant reviews from a Bayesian perspective,
see 39, 40, 47]. The validated model can be then used to make predictions of the Quantities
of Interest (QoI), the precise physical features of the response of the system targeted in the
simulation. This prediction step is commonly known as the forward problem in the scientific
literature.
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Fig. 2: A word-usage relative frequency plot [49], illustrating the exponential growth of computer technology in the mid
20th century, as well as developments in the fields of deterministic and stochastic optimization techniques, which ultimately
led to the emergence of ‘computational modeling’ as the third pillar of science [61]. Advances in the computational methods
and technology also led to the gradual popularity of Bayesian techniques in mathematical modeling toward the end of the
20th century, as well as the emergence of uncertainty quantification as a new field of science. Note that the positive-slope
linear behavior on this semi-logarithmic plot implies exponential growth.
The process of scientific inference described above, although straightforward at a first glance,
is severely complicated by the presence of many sources of uncertainty in multiple levels of data
acquisition and model construction, as well as the inverse and forward problems. In fact, the
significance of the effects of uncertainty in data and modeling has led to the emergence of a new
field of science within the past three decades, specifically dedicated to Uncertainty Quantifica-
tion (Figure 2).
1.1 Aleatoric vs. Epistemic Uncertainty
Different classes and sources of uncertainty have been already identified and extensively studied
at different levels of the scientific inference process, for example, in data acquisition and model
construction [2, 16, 20, 34, 68, 82], or in the discretization and numerical computations of the
inverse and forward problems [1, 5, 6, 9, 15, 42, 52, 55–58, 64, 68].
Uncertainty in data acquisition and model construction has been traditionally divided into
two categories of epistemic and aleatoric (aleatory) [11, 12, 19, 20, 23, 28, 62]. Aleatoric un-
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certainties are presumed to stem from inherent unpredictable variabilities and randomness in
observational data and are therefore thought to be irreducible. For example, the experiment of
throwing a die could be considered as an experiment with aleatoric uncertainty in its outcome
(but note that this statement is incorrect within the Bayesian framework. See §1.2 for clarifica-
tion). This form of uncertainty is sometimes also called structural variability or risk [20, 62] in
engineering literature. To the contrary, epistemic uncertainties represent any lack of knowledge
about data/experiment that can be potentially acquired in future, for example, the measure-
ment errors in an experiment.
There is a long history of confusion and disagreement in the scientific literature about the
exact definition and extent, or even the existence of these two forms of uncertainties [38, 39].
The origin of this century-long debate can be uncovered in the correspondence that is generally
assumed between the two classes of aleatoric vs. epistemic uncertainties and the two prominent
interpretations of probability: frequentist vs. Bayesian, respectively [17, 62, 81]. Thus, from a
historical perspective, aleatoric uncertainty is solely defined within the framework of frequentist
statistics [17].
We remark that in a pure Bayesian system of logical probability [39], which is the view we
adopt in this work, all uncertainty is epistemic [17]: randomness is strictly a means to express a
lack of knowledge. By contrast, what is often meant by aleatoric uncertainty in contemporary
scientific literature appears to conform well to the concept of model inadequacy, which is further
described below in §1.2.
Of course, on scales relevant to Quantum Mechanics [21], one may argue that Heisenberg’s
Uncertainty Principle [29] dictates an inherent uncertainty in Nature, setting a hard limit on
the extent of human knowledge. This strict epistemological limitation on human knowledge
would, therefore, resemble aleatoric uncertainty in Natural phenomena at the ontological level.
However, counter-arguments have been put forth by prominent physicists in the 20th century
against this Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics [13, 22, 38]. Regardless of the
validity of Copenhagen interpretation and the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, the quantum
mechanical limitations imposed on human knowledge can be considered irrelevant to virtually
all practical modeling problems beyond the subatomic scales of Quantum Mechanics (See [67]
for some illustrative discussions on this topic).
1.2 Model Inadequacy vs. Aleatoric Uncertainty
In an ideal and deterministic world, where there is neither model imperfection nor uncertainty
in computation or data, one would naturally expect the physical model to perfectly describe
observational data. This is, however, never the case in virtually all real-world inference prob-
lems. In reality, all models are imperfect or wrong (echoing the famous statement of E. Box
that “all models are wrong but some can be useful” [14]) and none can provide a full descrip-
tion of data. This model imperfection is widely known in the literature as model discrepancy or
model inadequacy [19, 53], the possible remedies of which have been already extensively studied
[2, 16, 42, 48, 50].
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Model inadequacy is often confused with aleatoric uncertainty since both can have identi-
cal effects on scientific inference. From a Bayesian perspective, one can argue that any type
of intrinsic unexplained variability observed in natural phenomena is a result of our limited
knowledge/data or a consequence of an imperfect physical model for the observed phenomenon.
Consider as an example, the experiment of throwing an unbiased die repeatedly under ‘simi-
lar conditions’. What do we really mean here by similar conditions? Indeed, if the experimenter
had complete knowledge of the conditions under which the die was thrown, there would be no
intrinsic unexplained randomness in the experiment’s output; that is, one would be able to
predict exactly the outcome of each die-throwing experiment.
Therefore, our ignorance of the many details of input data to a sequence of experiments and
the conditions under which the experiments were performed, manifest themselves in the form of
an inherent variability in the experimental output. In other words, no two experiments can be
truly considered as identical replicates of each other, because our knowledge of the experimental
setup as well as the input data to the experiments is almost always incomplete. This lack of
a complete detailed knowledge of the problem under study often leads to the development of
mathematical models that are inadequate in describing the underlying physics of the problem
correctly.
In sum, model inadequacy appears to be frequently confused with aleatoric uncertainty in
contemporary scientific literature. From a Bayesian viewpoint, aleatoric uncertainty does not
exist. As a result, aleatoric uncertainty is sometimes implicitly redefined as the class of uncer-
tainties for which there is no foreseeable possibility of elimination or reduction at the time of
inference [20], although it may be reduced with the arrival of new models, experimental designs,
or more detailed experimental data in future (see [69] for an elegant historical/philosophical re-
view).
1.3 The Goal of This Paper
Regardless of the terminology used for uncertainty classification, the truth is always convolved
with uncertainties that are either due to measurement errors or incomplete (insufficiently-
detailed) data. This lack of knowledge, in turn, leads to the development of imperfect physical
models whose predictions are inadequate for a complete description of the observed data. As
a result, new physically-inspired stochastic and/or deterministic models are needed to further
describe the inadequacy of the physical models.
Description of a general framework for incorporating different sources of uncertainty, in par-
ticular, the measurement error and model inadequacy in the process of scientific inference, seems
to be lacking in the current scientific and engineering literature. Most of the few resources avail-
able on this topic focus on special cases where the errors involved in the problem take simple
Gaussian forms and are assumed to be additive [2, 16, 18, 30, 31, 53, 65].
In the following sections, we consider the effects of model inadequacy (or as sometimes
referred to it by ‘aleatoric uncertainty’ in the literature), as well as the effects of noise and
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measurement error in experimental data, on parameter estimation and predictive inference.
Although we have argued, and assume throughout the rest of this paper, that all uncertainties
are epistemic (i.e., due to lack of knowledge), we recognize and show in the following sections that
model inadequacy and measurement errors require fundamentally different treatments in the
process of scientific inference. This is in agreement with the general consensus in the literature
[25]. A complete description of all the variables used in this manuscript is given in Table 1.
2 Modeling the Truth
2.1 The Relationship Between Observational Data and the Truth
Consider a set of ndo observations,
D = {D1, . . . ,Dndo} , (1)
collected about a set of natural phenomena. This observational dataset is a result of the convo-
lution of the unknown reality with various forms of uncertainties in the measurement process.
Let Ri represent the reality corresponding to the ith observation, Di, in dataset D. Let,
R = {R1, . . . ,Rndo} , (2)
represent the collection of ndo realities, corresponding to the observational dataset, D, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.
Each observation, Di ∈ D, and the corresponding reality to it, Ri ∈ R, is characterized by
nda variables (i.e., observable quantities), describing different characteristics of the events. Thus,
Ri is a vector of nda elements representing a single event in the nda-dimensional observational
sampling space ΩR ⊂ Rnda .
For the moment (and throughout §2 and 3), suppose we live in an ideal world where natural
phenomena are observed and measured exactly and accurately, without any possible bias, in-
adequacy, or contamination with noise. Therefore, the observational dataset, D, represents the
reality, R, exactly and deterministically. Hence, we will only consider modeling of the truth in
this section, dealing only with R and its members, Ri.
Although frequently independent of each other, the attributes of each event, Ri, or its oc-
currence could also depend on any subset, RRi ⊂ R, of the other events. In general, there
may also exist interdependencies between the attributes of each event (i.e., the elements of each
vector Ri). A well-known generic problem of this type in engineering and natural sciences is
regression, where the experimenter/observer has control over some characteristics of the events.
These characteristics serve as input to the experiment and result in some experimental output
that represent the response characteristics of the corresponding events.
Therefore, the attributes of a physical event can be often divided into a set of independent
characteristics, Rind, on which the rest of the event’s attributes (i.e., the dependent/response
variables, Rdep) depend,
Ri =
{
Rindi , R
dep
i
(
Rindi
) }
. (3)
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R Rind Rdep
R1 R11, · · · , Rj1 Rj+11 , · · · , Rnda1
R2 R12, · · · , Rj2 Rj+12 , · · · , Rnda2
.
..
.
..
.
..
Rndo R
1
ndo
, · · · , Rjndo Rj+1ndo , · · · , Rndando
Table 2: The Truth Set. The set of all phys-
ical events under study.
Convolution with−−−−−−−−−−→
Measurement Error
D Dind Ddep
D1 D11 , · · · , Dj1 Dj+11 , · · · , Dnda1
D2 D12 , · · · , Dj2 Dj+12 , · · · , Dnda2
.
..
.
..
.
..
Dndo D
1
ndo
, · · · , Djndo Dj+1ndo , · · · , Dndando
Table 3: The Data Set. A result of the convo-
lution of the truth set with measurement error.
Fig. 3: The Experimental Measurement Process. A schematic representation of the process of collecting observa-
tional dataset, D, which is a result of the convolution of the unknown truth, R, with various sources of uncertainty and
measurement error during the experimental data collection process. In the absence of noise and measurement error, the
set of observational data, D, in Table 3 would be identical to the truth set, R, in Table 2. Each physical event, Ri, and
the corresponding data observation, Di, is composed of a set of nda event attributes, a subset of which (R
dep
i and D
dep
i )
are hypothesized/known to depend on the remaining j independent characteristics of the event, (Rindi and D
ind
i ). For ex-
ample, in many problems, the temporal and spatial coordinates are the independent attributes of data and other physical
quantities are modeled as a function of these independent attributes.
Such modeling scenarios are abundant in science and engineering [53]; for example, a set of
fatigue experiments designed to measure maximum tolerable stress (the dependent variable) in
a material as a function of strain (the independent variable) [10], the measurement of the growth
of a malignant tumor as a function of time in a murine subject or patient [32, 59], the evolution
of protein amino acid sequence as function of its structural characteristics [33, 72, 79, 80], or
modeling the energetics and occurrence rates of astrophysical phenomena as a function of their
distances from the earth [70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 78].
2.2 The Forward Problem
Now, suppose we formulate a hypothesis with regards to the set of ndo events in R. This
hypothesis can be cast in the form of a mathematical model, Mphys, with the subscript phys
emphasizing the type of the model (i.e., a physics-based model). This physical model can be
thought of as a collection of mathematical operators (e.g., algebraic, differential, integral, . . . )
that takes as input, a set of npp physical parameters represented by the vector θphys ∈ Θphys ⊂
Rnpp . It then acts on some or all nda attributes of an independent event or a set of dependent
events, R ∈ ΩR, that is input to the model and generates an output response, R′, of the same
length/size as R, which may or may not be identical to the input R (Figure 4),
Mphys
(
R,θphys,Sphys
)
= R′ ∀ R ⊂ ΩR , (4)
Given the set of events, R, as in (2), the forward problem can be written as,
Mphys
(R,θphys,Sphys) = R′ ∀ R ⊂ ΩR . (5)
where,
R′ = {R′1, . . . ,R′ndo} , (6)
is the output of the physical model, Mphys, corresponding to the event set, R. When the events
in R are independent of each other, the forward problem takes the more simplified form,
Mphys
(
Ri,θphys,Sphys
)
= R′i ∀ Ri ∈ R ⊂ ΩR . (7)
In general, the observational information about each event, Ri, might be collected under a
specific set of conditions collectively named here as the physical scenario, Sphys. The scenario,
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(a) Misspecified model. (b) Correctly-specified model.
Fig. 4: Schematic diagrams of the physical model with its input and output arguments. The physical model
takes as input a set of values for the model parameters, θphys, as well as the set of attributes, R, of an event or a collection
of events. It then outputs a vector, R′, of the same length/size as R, whose elements may or may not be identical to the
corresponding elements in R, depending on θphys and the validity of the physical model. (a) A misspecified physical
model whose output for at least one event, Ri, in the event set, R, does not match the input vector, Ri, for any possible
values of θphys. (b) A correctly-specified physical model for which there is at least one set of input parameter values,
θ̂phys, that result in an output from the physical model which is identical to the input, Ri, for all Ri ∈ R [53].
Sphys, describes the set of all features of the scientific problem at hand, that can be exactly
specified, that is also independent of the data, R, the physical model, Mphys, and its param-
eters, θphys. These features typically describe and depend on the experimental/observational
setup for data collection [53].
For example, Sphys could describe the limitations of a detector that was used for data collec-
tion [70, 71, 73–78, 78]. Thus, although Sphys is independent of R, the observation of individual
events in the dataset, D, and hence the set R, is not independent of Sphys in general.
2.3 The Inverse Problem
If the proposed model is capable of describing the phenomenon of interest perfectly without any
bias or inadequacy, then by definition, there should exist at least one set of feasible parameter
values θphys = θ̂phys ∈ Θphys for which,
R−Mphys
(R, θ̂phys,Sphys) = 0 , (8)
where 0 is the null matrix of size ndo × nda. In the case of independent events,
Ri −Mphys
(
Ri, θ̂phys,Sphys
)
= 0 ∀ Ri ∈ R , (9)
where 0 is now the null vector of length nda. Thus, given a perfect model and an ideal dataset
with no measurement error, the problem of inference is reduced to solving (8) or a system of
ndo equations of the form (9) to obtain the feasible values, θ̂phys, of the set of parameters of the
physical model satisfying (8) or (9).
In mathematical modeling, this process is widely known as inverse problem or model cali-
bration, as illustrated in Figure 1a. When there is a θ̂phys for which the physical model, Mphys,
perfectly describes the truth (by satisfying (8) or (9)), then Mphys is said to be a correctly-
specified or well-specified model [53] as illustrated in Figure 4b. In some problems, there might
exist multiple or even uncountably infinite number of θ̂phys that satisfy (8). In such cases, the
system of equations is said to be degenerate or ill-posed in the sense of Hadamard [27].
3 Modeling the Truth in the Presence of Model Inadequacy
One can envisage many experimental setups in which the same input to the experiment, results
in a variety of possible outcomes. For example, the experiment of throwing an unbiased die un-
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der similar conditions yields six inherently different possible outcomes. A more relevant example
to the field of engineering is a set of stress-strain data obtained from a heterogeneous material.
In such data, a single strain could yield several different stress values in repeated identical ex-
periments, depending on the level of heterogeneity and imperfection of the material being tested.
Such apparently unexplained variabilities and heterogeneities in observational data with re-
spect to the predictions of the physical model, fall into the category of model inadequacy, or
model discrepancy, sometimes also referred to it as structural uncertainty or aleatoric uncer-
tainty. This is a class of uncertainty that presumably cannot be reduced with further collection
of data or more accurate measurements of the same characteristic features already describing
each event, Ri ∈ R.
Regardless of the origins of model inadequacy – whether it be a wrong physical model or
insufficiently-detailed data – such discrepancies between model predictions and data almost al-
ways exist, and their behavior has to be described by yet another set of models of stochastic
origin.
3.1 The Construction of Inadequacy Model
When there is unexplained variability in the events with respect to the predictions of the physical
model, the model is said to be inadequate or misspecified [53], and the output of the physical
model for some or all events, Ri ∈ R, does not match the available data. Hence, the equalities
in (8) and (9) do not hold. Rather we have in general,
R−Mphys
(R,θphys,Sphys) = U , (10)
where U is set of ndo vectors, U i, each of which corresponds to one event, Ri ∈ R. In the case
of independent events, (10) takes the more simplified form,
Ri −Mphys
(
Ri,θphys,Sphys
)
= U i ∀ Ri ∈ R . (11)
Each U i is a vector of length nda, some elements of which, corresponding to the response
variables, Rdepi ⊂ Ri, are not anymore deterministic but random stochastic variables. In other
words, for the same control variables Rind ⊂ R = {Rdep,Rdep}, there can be a finite or infinite
number of possible values for the response vector Rdep. But the physical model is only capable
of fitting some representative deterministic average output response to Rdepi ⊂ Ri , ∀Ri ∈ R.
Therefore, the set,
U = {U1, . . . ,Undo} , (12)
is a collection (i.e., a ndo×nda matrix) of deterministic and stochastic variables whose behavior
has to be determined by yet another model, M inad, of statistical and physical origin (as opposed
to the deterministic physical origin ofMphys (Figure 5). This stochastic model depends explicitly
on the output of the proposed physical model, Mphys,
U ∼M inad
(R,θinad,Mphys(R,θphys,Sphys)) , (13)
where θinad represents the set of npi parameters of M inad. Here, the subscript inad stands
for inadequacy. In the case of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) events, the above
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Fig. 5: A schematic illustration of the relationship between the physical model, Mphys, and the inadequacy model, M inad:
the statistical model that describes the inadequacy of the physical model with respect to the available data. On input,
M inad takes a set of values for its parameters, θinad, the output of the physical model, R′, and the truth about the
collection of events, R. On output, M inad gives the probability of the truth being R, given the physical model’s output,
R′, and the specific values of the parameters of the physical and inadequacy models: {θphys,θinad}.
equation can be written as,
U i ∼M inad
(
Ri,θinad,Mphys(Ri,θphys,Sphys)
)
. (14)
The special case where the parameters of M inad depend explicitly on R
ind
i ⊂ Ri, is known
as heteroscedasticity in the statistical literature [63].
3.2 The Likelihood Function in the Presence of Model Inadequacy
In the presence of model inadequacy, the inference problem cannot be solved deterministically
anymore as in §2.3, rather one has to first derive the likelihood function (i.e., the unnormalized
density function), L, of the parameters of the physical and inadequacy models. Let,
Mpi = {Mphys,M inad} , (15)
θpi = {θphys,θinad} , (16)
represent respectively, the combined physical and inadequacy models for R, and the combined
set of parameters of the two models. Then, by definition,
pi
(R∣∣θpi,Mpi) ≡ pi(U∣∣θpi,Mpi) , (17)
represents the multivariate probability density function (PDF), pi(·), of obtaining R given Mpi
and the parameter values Mpi, which in the case of i.i.d. events simplifies to,
pi
(
Ri
∣∣θpi,Mpi) ≡ pi(U i∣∣θpi,Mpi) ∀ Ri ∈ R , . (18)
Then, the likelihood of θpi being the correct set of values for the parameters of Mpi, in the
light of available data, R, becomes,
L(θpi;R) ≡ L(θpi;U) (19)
≡ pi(R∣∣θpi,Mpi) (20)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
pi
(
Ri
∣∣θinad,M inad(Ri,θinad,Mphys(Ri,θphys,Sphys))) , (21)
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where again, the last equality, (21), holds only on the special occasion where the observed events
are independent of each other and are equally likely to occur, that is, independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.). Although the i.i.d. property represents a special case, in practice it
holds for a wide range of scientific inference and modeling problems.
The problem of inference is now reduced to finding a θpi = {θphys,θinad} such that the joint
probability of obtaining all events in R together, combined with any prior knowledge about
the parameters of the models, Mpi = {Mphys,M inad}, is maximized. From the Bayes rule, it
follows,
pi
(
θpi
∣∣U ,Mpi, Iθpi) = pi
(U∣∣θpi,Mpi)pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
pi
(U∣∣Mpi, Iθpi) , (22)
or equivalently,
pi
(
θpi
∣∣R,Mpi, Iθpi) = pi
(R∣∣θpi,Mpi)pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
pi
(R∣∣Mpi, Iθpi) , (23)
where Iθpi represents any prior knowledge about all unknown parameters, θpi, of the physical
and inadequacy models together. The subject of constructing the prior PDF, pi
(
θpi|Mpi, Iθpi
)
,
from the available knowledge in an inference problem is as old as the Bayesian probability theory
itself. Over the past century, several methods such as Jeffreys’ principle of invariance under
reparametrization [41] or Jaynes’ principle of maximum entropy [26, 35–37, 39, 39] have been
developed to construct objective priors for Bayesian inference.
3.3 Popular Choices of Inadequacy Model
The Multivariate Normal (MVN) distribution is undoubtedly the most popular and widely-used
choice of probability density function for inadequacy models in scientific inference, although it
has appeared under different names, notably the Least-Squares method first introduced by
Adrien Legendre in 1805 [46]. Another popular choice of inadequacy model is the Laplace dis-
tribution, more commonly known as the Least Absolute Deviation method first introduced by
Pierre Laplace in 1774 [43, 45].
Despite their popularity, neither MVN nor Laplace are the most appropriate choices of
inadequacy model, M inad, for every scientific inference problem. Since M inad represents the
inadequacy of the physical model, in general, it has to be also inferred from the characteristics
of data and the physical phenomena being investigated.
4 Modeling the Truth, Confounded with Noise (Measurement Error)
Independently of the model inadequacy, experimental observations are always contaminated
with measurement error (or equivalently as we use hereafter, noise). Such sources of uncertainty
in data are sometimes called epistemic uncertainty, although the scope of epistemic uncertainty
goes beyond measurement error, as we discussed in §1.
Unlike model inadequacy, uncertainty due to measurement error is a result of the funda-
mental limitations of the measurement process and instruments. It is therefore assumed to be
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reducible by gathering higher quality information about the phenomenon of interest, for exam-
ple, by making more accurate measurements with more accurate devices.
The inevitable existence of noise in every real-world experiment implies that the truth, R,
about an event will never be known to the observer/experimenter unless the uncertainty in data
is exactly and deterministically modeled and removed. This is, however, impossible since the
effects of noise on reality are virtually never known deterministically. Under the most optimistic
scenarios, an experimenter may only be able to make an educated guess on the general average
stochastic effects of the noise on the experimental measurements.
In other words, what an observer/experimenter can perceive about the truth, R, of an event
is only the stochastic output, D, of a complex measurement process whose input is R. There-
fore, a primary and major task in designing and performing an experiment is to alleviate to
the extent possible, the effects of this stochastic noise component on inferences made about the
truth.
Under a well-determined experimental setup and measurement process, one may be able to
provide a stochastic model for the random effects of noise on the truth. Let,
Di ∼Mnois,i(Ri,θnois,i
)
, (24)
represent the ith observational data in the dataset D = {D1, . . . ,Dndo} which consists of ndo
observations. Here, Mnois,i represents the stochastic noise model for the ith event, Ri. Each ob-
servation, Di ∈ D, results from a complex convolution of the truth, Ri ∈ R, with various types
of noise in the measurement process, all of which we hope to approximate and model by Mnois,i.
The noise model,Mnois,i, takes as input, the set of npn,i parameters represented by the vector
θnois,i. Here the subscript i, wherever it appears in (24) and throughout this section, is used to
indicate that the corresponding object specifically belongs to or is defined in relation with the
ith event, Ri. The subscript pn in npn,i stands for the parameters of the noise model.
A typical example of such inference problem, involving distinct noise models corresponding to
each Ri ∈ R, can be found in the field of Astronomy and Cosmology where observational data is
frequently gathered by multiple instruments of different measurement accuracies [71, 74, 77, 78].
Since Di is a random variable, there is no one-to-one mapping between Di and the truth
Ri. Given the noise model, Mnois,i, and its parameters, θnois,i, the corresponding PDF of Di is,
PDF
(
Di
)
def
= pi
(
Di
∣∣Ri,θnois,i,Mnois,i) (25)
There are multiple reasons that render (25) useless by itself, even when the exact mathe-
matical form of Mnois,i as well as its parameters, θnois,i, are known:
– Firstly, this formulation requires us to know the truth Ri as an input to Mnois,i. In practice
however, we never know the truth.
– Secondly, the observer/experimenter can never obtain multiple realizations of Di for the ex-
act same truth Ri. What an experimenter gathers about an event, Ri, is a single observation
of it, Di, which is a result of the convolution of Ri with noise. From a Bayesian perspective,
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such experiments can never be repeated under the exact same conditions to obtain multiple
observations, Di, for the same Ri.
– Thirdly and most importantly, the input quantities to the physical model, Mphys, in (8) and
(9) are R and Ri respectively, not D and Di.
A better formulation of the problem can be obtained by asking an appropriate question in
relation to noise in data: Given a single observation, Di, obtained for an unknown event, Ri,
what is the probability that the underlying truth about this event is R∗i? Here the superscript
∗ is to emphasize that R∗i may not necessarily correspond to the truth Ri.
This question has a straightforward answer using the Bayesian inversion method applied to
(25), such that the probability of R∗i being the truth about the ith event could be written as,
pi
(
R∗i
∣∣Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) = pi(Di∣∣R∗i,θnois,i,Mnois,i) pi(R∗i∣∣IRi)pi(Di∣∣θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) , (26)
where the left-hand-side of the equation is the posterior probability density function of the
truth, the first term in the numerator is the likelihood function of R∗i, which is equivalent
to the probability density function of Di in (25), and IRi represents the experimenter’s prior
knowledge about Ri. The denominator is simply a normalization factor (the Bayesian evidence)
that makes the left-hand-side a properly normalized PDF. It gives the probability of observing
Di averaged over all possible values, R
∗
i, for the truth, Ri.
In practice, the state of experimenter’s prior knowledge, IRi , about the truth is often complete
ignorance, meaning that all possibilities for the truth are equally probable in the eyes of the
experimenter, regardless of the noise model. Therefore, pi
(
R∗i
∣∣IRi) is frequently assigned an
improper (unbounded) uniform distribution [35, 36, 39], often without explicitly acknowledging
it. There are, however, important exceptions to this general rule, for example, in hierarchical
Bayesian inference problems [71, 78] where Ri is defined only on a subset of the real numbers,
R.
4.1 Noise Models Are Fundamentally Different From Inadequacy Models
Unlike the case of model inadequacy studied in §3 where the parameters, θinad, of the inadequacy
model, M inad, were a priori unknown and were to be inferred from data, here it is essential to
know the mathematical form of Mnois,i (i.e., the PDF in (25)) for each observation, Di, as well
as its parameter values, θnois,i. In other words, the noise model and its parameters are part of
observational data that will have to be fed to the physical and inadequacy models. Otherwise,
it would be impossible to construct (26), and subsequently solve (8).
Another difference with the case of inadequacy model is the fact that the presence of noise
in data does not necessarily invalidate (8). As long as the physical model, Mphys, is perfectly
capable of describing R – an ideal assumption that we make in this section (i.e., §4) – and the
sampling space of R∗i is accurately defined such that,
pi
(
Ri
∣∣Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i) 6= 0 ∀ Ri ∈ R , (27)
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then, there will be at least one set of physical parameters, θ̂phys, for which R∗ = R satisfies (8),
R∗ −R∗′ = 0 , (28)
where,
R∗′ = Mphys
(R∗,θphys,Sphys) , (29)
or in the case of i.i.d. events,
R∗i −R∗′i = 0 ∀ R∗i ∈ R∗ , (30)
with,
R∗′i = Mphys
(
R∗i,θphys,Sphys
) ∀ R∗i ∈ R∗ . (31)
The symbol R∗ in (28) represents a set of possible realizations, R∗i, of each of the events,
Ri ∈ R,
R∗ = {R∗1, · · · ,R∗ndo} . (32)
Therefore, the set R∗ represents a possible realization of R, which may satisfy (28) for no
θphys values, or a single value, or multiple values, or an infinite number of values of θphys. Let,
Mnois = {Mnois,1, . . . ,Mnois,ndo} , (33)
Θnois = {θnois,1, . . . ,θnois,ndo} , (34)
denote respectively, the set of noise models corresponding to each event in R, and the set of ‘a
priori known’ parameters of each model, Mnois,i ∈ Mnois. Then, one can write the probability
of R∗ being the truth, R, via the Bayes rule as,
pi
(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) = pi(D∣∣R∗, Θnois,Mnois) pi(R∗∣∣IR)
pi
(D∣∣Θnois,Mnois, IR) (35)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
pi
(
R∗i
∣∣Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) (36)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
pi
(
Di
∣∣R∗i,θnois,i,Mnois,i) pi(R∗i∣∣IRi)
pi
(
Di
∣∣θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) . (37)
where IR represents the experimenter’s prior knowledge about the entire set R. The latter two
equalities hold only under the assumption of independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) of
the experimental measurements, Di ∈ D.
4.2 The Likelihood Function in the Presence of Data Uncertainty
In most practical inference problems, the noise model, Mnois,i, for a given event, Ri ∈ R, has
a continuous probability density function for R∗i, leading to infinitely many possibilities, R∗i,
for each event, Ri. This means that the set R∗ is not unique. Therefore, one can construct a
superset, ΩR∗ , consisting of all possible combinatorial realizations of the set of events in R,
ΩR∗ =
{R∗1, . . . ,R∗j, . . .} , (38)
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where only and only one realization, R∗j ∈ ΩR∗ , corresponds to the truth set, R. Many mem-
bers of ΩR∗ might satisfy (28) for some specific parameter values, θphys, that is not necessarily
the same parameter values for which R satisfies (28). To the contrary, there might exist other
members of ΩR∗ that do not satisfy (28) for any possible parameter values, θphys.
The superset ΩR∗ can be finite, or countably/uncountably infinite, depending on the type
of measurement uncertainties involved in the problem. When all of the noise models, Mnois,i ∈
Mnois, for the specific problem under study give rise to sets of finite possibilities, R∗i, for the
corresponding events, Ri ∈ R, then the size of ΩR∗ would be also finite. Otherwise, if any
or all of the noise models are countably/uncountably infinite, then ΩR∗ would be also count-
ably/uncountably infinite.
Now, let ΩR∗
(
θphys
) ⊂ ΩR∗ represent the set of all possible realizations, R∗ ∈ ΩR∗ , of R
that satisfy (28) for the given θphys. Then, the likelihood (i.e., the unnormalized probability)
of θphys being the true set of parameter values for Mphys can be written as the sum of the
probabilities of all possible realizations, R∗ ⊂ ΩR∗
(
θphys
)
,
L(θphys) ≡ pi(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣θphys,Mphys, IR) (39)
=
∫
ΩR∗
(
θphys
) pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) dR∗ (40)
=
∫
ΩR∗
1
(R∗) pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) dR∗ (41)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
pi
(
Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i
∣∣θphys,Mphys, IRi) (42)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
∫
ΩR∗
1
(
R∗i
)
pi
(
R∗i
∣∣Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) dR∗i , (43)
where 1(·) is an indicator function which has the value 1, only if R∗ and R∗i satisfy (28) and
(30) respectively for the given value of θphys, otherwise it is 0,
1
(
R∗i
)
def
=
{
1 R∗′i = R
∗
i ,
0 otherwise ,
, 1 < i < ndo , (44)
1
(R∗) = ndo∏
i=1
1
(
R∗i
)
(45)
def
=
{
1 R∗′ = R∗ ,
0 otherwise .
(46)
where R∗′ and R∗′i are defined by (29) and (31). The equality in (43) holds only under the
assumption of independent and identical distribution (i.i.d.) of the experimental measurements,
Di ∈ D. A schematic diagram illustrating the derivation of this likelihood function is given in
Figure 6.
Thus, the problem of inference is now to compute and maximize the PDF of θphys, which
can be obtained by combining (40) with any prior knowledge, Iθphys , about the parameters of
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Fig. 6: A schematic illustration of the derivation of the likelihood function when the physical model, Mphys, has no
inadequacy and the observational dataset, D, is subject to noise and measurement error. In such scenario, if the set of
noise models and their parameters, Mnois(Θnois), affecting the data are known, then one has to consider all possibilities,
{R∗1, . . . ,R∗j, . . .}, for the unknown truth, R, underlying the observational data, D. All such possibilities are then fed to
the physical model, which yield the corresponding output set {R∗′1, . . . ,R∗′j, . . .}. Then, the probability of observing D
given a specific set of values for the parameters, θphys, of the physical model, is the sum of the probabilities of all possible
realizations, R∗, of the truth, R, that satisfy the physical model (i.e., when R∗ = R∗′).
the model using the Bayes rule,
pi
(
θphys
∣∣ D, Θnois,Mnois,Mphys, IR, Iθphys)
=
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣θphys,Mphys, IR) pi(θphys∣∣Mphys, Iθphys)
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mphys, IR, Iθphys) (47)
=
[∫
ΩR∗
(
θphys
) pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) dR∗] pi(θphys∣∣Mphys, Iθphys)
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mphys, IR, Iθphys) , (48)
where the denominator is simply a factor that properly normalizes the posterior distribution
of θphys to a proper probability density function, such that the integral of (48) over the entire
parameter space, Θphys, is 1,
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mphys, IR, Iθphys) =∫
Θphys
[ ∫
ΩR∗
(
θphys
) pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) dR∗] pi(θphys∣∣Mphys, Iθphys) dθphys . (49)
It is clear from (40), (41), (43), and (48), that the posterior PDF of the parameters of the
physical model, pi
(
θphys
∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois,Mphys, Iθphys), depends only implicitly on the physical
model,Mphys, and its parameters, θphys. The only influence ofMphys and θphys on the posterior
PDF of (48) is through the definition of the domain of integration in the likelihood function of
θphys in (40), (41), and (43).
This seemingly-bizarre behavior of the posterior PDF in (48) is a natural consequence of the
underlying idealistic assumption that we have made in this section, that is, there is no model
inadequacy and the physical model could perfectly describe R if we knew it.
5 Hierarchical Modeling of the Truth, in the Presence of Model Inadequacy and
Data Uncertainty
So far, none of the idealized scenarios in §2, §3, and §4 represent what a practical researcher
confronts in modeling natural phenomena. In reality, an experimenter collects a dataset, D, each
event of which is,
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1. contaminated with various types of noise (measurement error) and is also,
2. insufficiently detailed,
leading to the development of wrong or incomplete physical models that are inadequate in
providing a full description of the available dataset, D. Hence, the resulting dataset appears to
be heterogeneous with respect to the predictions of the physical model at hand.
5.1 Statement of the Hierarchical Bayesian Inverse Problem
Given,
1. the dataset D = {Di, · · · ,Dndo},
2. the corresponding set of noise models, Mnois, and their ‘a priori known’ parameters, Θnois,
as given by (33) and (34), corresponding to each observation, Di ∈ D,
3. a physical model, Mphys,
4. a stochastic physics-based model, M inad, for the inadequacy of Mphys in describing D,
we seek to quantify the posterior probability density function of the combined set of unknown
parameters of the two physical and inadequacy models θpi =
{
θphys,θinad
}
.
5.2 General Solution
Our goal can be achieved by combining the approaches already developed in the previous sec-
tions §2, §3, and §4. First, note that the presence of model inadequacy requires us to use the
modified form of (8) as given in (10). However, this equation takes as input, the truth, R, about
the set of observations, D. Since R is unknown, we have to consider all possibilities, R∗, for R,
whose PDF is given by (35).
To do so, consider for the moment, a single realization,R∗, of the truth dataset,R, as defined
in (32). The corresponding equations to (10), (12), and (13) for R∗ would be then,
U∗ = R∗ −Mphys
(R∗,θphys,Sphys) , (50)
U∗ = {U∗1, . . . ,U∗ndo} , (51)
U∗ ∼M inad
(R∗,θinad,Mphys(R∗,θphys,Sphys)) . (52)
Therefore, the modified set of equations corresponding to (19), (20), and (21) take the form,
L(θpi ; R∗,Mpi) ≡ L(θpi ; U∗,Mpi) (53)
≡ pi(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi) (54)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
pi
(
R∗i
∣∣θinad,M inad(R∗i,θinad,Mphys(R∗i,θphys,Sphys))) . (55)
Similar to (22) and (23), the posterior probability density of θpi for a single realization, R∗,
of R can be then computed from the Bayes rule as,
pi
(
θpi
∣∣R∗,Mpi, Iθpi) = pi
(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi)pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
pi
(R∗∣∣Mpi, Iθpi) , (56)
However, the set R∗ is only one possibility among the (potentially infinitely) many possible
representations of the truth set, R. Therefore, the likelihood in (54) has to be further modified
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to include not one, but all possibilities, R∗ ∈ ΩR∗ , for the reality, R.
Given the observed dataset, D, and the associated set of the noise models, Mnois, and their
parameters, Θnois, the probability of R∗ being the truth, R, is given by the posterior PDF
in (35). Thus, combining (35) with (54) yields the modified likelihood function of the model
parameters as,
L(θpi ; R∗,D, Θnois,Mnois, IR,Mpi)
≡ pi(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi) × pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) (57)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
pi
(
R∗i
∣∣θinad,M inad(R∗i,θinad,Mphys(R∗i,θphys,Sphys)))
× pi(R∗i∣∣Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) . (58)
One can then marginalize (57) over R∗ to obtain the marginal likelihood of the parameters
of the models, given only the known quantities: D, Θnois, Mnois, IR, Mphys, M inad,
L(θpi ; D, Θnois,Mnois, IR,Mpi)
≡ pi(D, Θnois,Mnois|θpi,Mpi, IR) (59)
≡
∫
ΩR∗
pi
(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi) × pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) dR∗ (60)
i.i.d.
=
ndo∏
i=1
∫
ΩR
pi
(
R∗i
∣∣θinad,M inad(R∗i,θinad,Mphys(R∗i,θphys,Sphys)))
× pi(R∗i∣∣Di,θnois,i,Mnois,i, IRi) dR∗i . (61)
A schematic diagram illustrating the derivation of this likelihood function is given in Fig-
ure 7. Despite their similarities, there is a fine difference between the marginalization over R∗
performed in the above likelihood function and the marginalization performed in the case of an
ideal physical model in the presence of data uncertainty, which appears in (48). The marginal-
ization of (57) and (58) is performed over all possible realizations of the truth, ΩR∗ , whether or
not they satisfy (28), whereas in (40) it is assumed that the physical model has no inadequacy
in describing the truth. Therefore, the marginalization in (40) is strictly performed on a subset
of ΩR∗ that satisfy (28).
By contrast, not all possible realizations, R∗ ∈ ΩR∗ , of R∗ in the hierarchical likelihood
function of (60) have to necessarily satisfy (28). For the construction of this likelihood function,
we have already assumed that the physical model is inadequate in describing the truth, R.
Hence, the marginalization spans the entire sampling space of R∗, which is ΩR∗ .
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Fig. 7: A schematic illustration of the derivation of the likelihood function when the observational data, D, is subject
to measurement error described by the set of noise models, Mnois, and their known parameters, Θnois. In addition, the
physical model, Mphys, is inadequate, requiring an inadequacy model, M inad, with unknown parameters, θinad, whose
values have to be constrained by data. Given {D, Θnois,Mnois}, there exists a range of possibilities, R∗, for the unknown
truth, R. The set ΩR∗ represents the collection of all such possibilities. Then, each one of these possibilities is fed to the
physical model, whose output, R∗′ ∈ ΩR∗ ′, is subsequently fed to the inadequacy model, M inad, which in turn outputs
the probability of obtaining R∗ given R∗′ for the specific set of values of the parameters, θpi = {θphys,θinad}, of the
physical and inadequacy models, Mpi = {Mphys,M inad}. Simultaneously, the probability of R∗ being R given only
{D, Θnois,Mnois} and the prior knowledge about the truth, IR, is also known. Therefore, the probability of R∗ being R
given all three physical, inadequacy, and noise models, as well as their parameter values, can be computed. Finally, the
probability of {D, Θnois,Mnois} being the correct representation of the truth, R, given {Mpi,θpi, IR}, can be obtained
by marginalizing the probability of R∗ over all possibilities, R∗ ∈ ΩR∗ , for the truth, R.
Now, with the hierarchical likelihood function of θpi in hand, one can use the Bayes rule to
write the posterior PDF of θpi as,
pi
(
θpi
∣∣ D, Θnois,Mnois,Mpi, IR, Iθpi)
=
L(θpi ; D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mpi, IR, Iθpi) (62)
=
∫
ΩR∗
pi
(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi) pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) dR∗ pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mpi, IR, Iθpi) , (63)
in which the denominator is again a factor that properly normalizes the posterior distribution
to a posterior PDF. It gives the probability of all possibilities, ΩR∗ , for the truth, R, where
ΩR∗ is fully determined by {D, Θnois,Mnois},
pi
(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mpi, IR, Iθpi) ≡ pi(ΩR∗∣∣Mpi, IR, Iθpi) (64)
=
∫
Θpi
∫
ΩR
pi
(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi) pi(R∗∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois, IR) pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi) dR∗ dθpi . (65)
Plugging (35) into (63) one gets,
pi
(
θpi
∣∣D, Θnois,Mnois,Mpi, IR, Iθpi)
=
∫
ΩR
pi
(D∣∣R∗, Θnois,Mnois) pi(R∗∣∣IR) pi(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi) dR∗ pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
pi
(D∣∣Θnois,Mnois, IR) pi(D, Θnois,Mnois∣∣Mpi, IR, Iθpi) . (66)
Thus, in a sense, the two latter terms, pi
(R∗∣∣IR) pi(R∗∣∣θpi,Mpi), in the integrand of
the numerator of (66), act like a prior probability on the likelihood of the observed dataset,
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pi
(D∣∣R∗, Θnois,Mnois), and correct its value according to the physical and inadequacy models
in hand, for the given set of parameter values, θpi.
In the case of i.i.d. events, ignoring the normalization constants, the posterior PDF of (66)
takes the simple form,
pi
(
θpi
∣∣ D, Θnois,Mnois,Mpi, IR, Iθpi)
∝ pi(θpi∣∣Mpi, Iθpi)
×
ndo∏
i=1
∫
ΩR
pi
(
Di
∣∣R∗i,θnois,i,Mnois,i) pi(R∗i∣∣IRi) pi(R∗i∣∣θpi,Mpi) dR∗i . (67)
Equations (66) and (67) describe the general form of the hierarchical (multilevel) posterior
probability density function of the parameters of the physical model, Mphys, whose inadequacy
is described by the stochastic inadequacy model, M inad, in the presence measurement error in
data, whose effects are assumed to be fully determined by a set of noise models, Mnois, and
their known parameters, Θnois. uunionsq
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